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Abstract. The recent explosive growth of mobile data traffic, the continuously 
growing demand for higher data rates, and the steadily increasing pressure for 
higher mobility have led to the fifth-generation mobile networks. To this end, 
network-coding (NC)-enabled mobile small cells are considered as a promising 
5G technology to cover the urban landscape by being set up on-demand at any 
place, and at any time on any device. In particular, this emerging paradigm has 
the potential to provide significant benefits to mobile networks as it can de-
crease packet transmission in wireless multicast, provide network capacity im-
provement, and achieve robustness to packet losses with low energy consump-
tion. However, despite these significant advantages, NC-enabled mobile small 
cells are vulnerable to various types of attacks due to the inherent vulnerabili-
ties of NC. Therefore, in this paper, we provide a categorization of potential se-
curity attacks in NC-enabled mobile small cells. Particularly, our focus is on the 
identification and categorization of the main potential security attacks on a sce-
nario architecture of the ongoing EU funded H2020-MSCA project “SECRET” 
being focused on secure network coding-enabled mobile small cells.  
Keywords: Mobile Small Cells, 5G Communications, Security, Network Cod-
ing, D2D Communications. 
1 Introduction 
The recent explosive growth of mobile data traffic, the continuously growing demand 
for higher data rates, and the steadily increasing pressure for higher mobility have led 
to the fifth-generation (5G) of mobile communications. 5G communications target to 
achieve big data bandwidth, infinite capability of networking and extensive signal 
coverage to support a plethora of high-quality personalised services to subscribers, 
while at the same time the capital and operating expenditures (i.e., CAPEX and 
OPEX) of mobile operators are being reduced. Towards this direction, 5G communi-
cations systems will integrate a wide spectrum of enabling technologies [1-5]. 
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Small cells technology is considered as a major 5G enabling technology, as it can 
enable effective delivery of ubiquitous 5G services in a cost-effective and energy 
efficient manner. Indeed, mobile small cells can cover the urban landscape by being 
set up on-demand at any place, and at any time on any device. The mobile small cell 
hotspots are the vehicle for experiencing a plethora of 5G broadband services at low 
cost with reduced impact on mobile battery lifetime [6-8].  
In addition, Network Coding (NC) technology can be foreseen as a promising solu-
tion for the wireless network of mobile small cells to increase its throughput and im-
prove its performance. In fact, NC technology is an emerging communication para-
digm that has the potential to provide significant benefits to networks as it can de-
crease packet transmission in wireless multicast [9, 10], provide network capacity 
improvement [11], and achieve robustness to packet losses [12] and low energy con-
sumption [13]. However, despite the significant advantages of NC technology, net-
work coding-enabled wireless networks are vulnerable to various types of attacks [12, 
14-18]. Based on that and the fact that the security is critical factor for the success of 
upcoming 5G networks, such as the network coding-enabled mobile small cells, novel 
security mechanisms against these types of attacks are required [19-22]. Towards this 
direction, the first step is the identification of the security threats in such networks. 
Therefore, in this paper, we provide a categorization of potential security attacks in 
network coding-enabled mobile small cells due to the inherent vulnerabilities of NC. 
In particular, our focus is on the identification and categorization of the main potential 
security attacks on a scenario architecture of the EU funded H2020-MSCA project 
“SECRET” [23] focused on secure network coding-enabled mobile small cells.    
Following the introduction, this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we 
provide an overview of the studied scenario architecture which is focused on secure 
network coding-enabled mobile small cells. In Section 3, a brief overview of the two 
types of network coding protocols is given. In Section 4, the main categories of poten-
tial security attacks in network coding-enabled mobile small cells due to the inherent 
vulnerabilities of NC are presented. Finally, Section 5 concludes this paper. 
2 Scenario Architecture 
In this section, we provide the scenario architecture of the EU funded H2020-MSCA 
project “SECRET” (See Figure 1) which is focused on secure network coding-enabled 
mobile small cells [23] This scenario architecture consists of a macro cell which is 
splitted into a number of mobile small cells. Each mobile small cell is controlled by a 
cluster-head (i.e., hotspot), a mobile device (i.e., mobile node) within the identified 
cluster of mobile devices that is nominated to play the role of the local radio manager 
in order to control and maintain the cluster. Moreover, the cluster-heads (i.e., 
hotspots) of the different clusters cooperate to form a wireless network of mobile 
small cells that have several gateways/entry points to the mobile network using intel-
ligent high-speed connections. It is worthwhile to mention that the cluster-heads (i.e., 
hotspots) of the different clusters are controlled by a centralized software-defined 
controller. Finally, the data communication between the mobile devices (i.e., mobile 
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nodes) is established through Device-to-Device (D2D) communications and opti-
mized by network coding technology. In particular, in the studied scenario, it is as-
sumed that a source mobile node (SN), locating at a mobile small cell, wants to mul-
ticast packets to two destination mobile nodes (DNs), locating at another mobile small 
cell. Thus, packets from the SN are coded (i.e., Random Linear Network Coding) and 
traverse multiple devices, over a multi-hop D2D network, before arriving to the DNs, 
locating at another mobile small cell, where they are decoded. The multi-hop D2D 
network consists of a number of User Equipments (UEs), such as legitimate mobile 
nodes, and relay mobile nodes (RNs), as depicted in Figure 1.  
 
 
Figure 1. Scenario Architecture 
3 Network Coding 
Due to low communication bandwidth, packet loss and power consumption con-
straints, network coding can be a good solution for wireless networks [6, 7]. Network 
coding methods are generally classified into state-aware network coding protocols 
and stateless network coding protocols. 
In state-aware network coding protocols, each node has partial or full network state 
information, such as network topology and the packets in the buffer of its neighbours   
Based on this information, a network code is generated that is decodable by the 
neighboring nodes. However, the state-aware network coding protocols confront sev-
eral security issues due to the available knowledge of the network sate information. 
On the other hand, the stateless network coding protocols do not rely on the net-
work state information in order to decide when and how to mix the packets at each 
intermediate node. Thus, the stateless network coding protocols are not affected by 
dynamically changing topologies. Finally, this kind of network coding protocols are 
more immune to security threats compared to the state-aware network coding proto-
cols due to their independence of the network state information [11, 12].  
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4 Security Threats in Network Coding-enabled Mobile Small 
Cells 
In this section, we present the main categories of potential security attacks in network 
coding-enabled mobile small cells due to the inherent vulnerabilities of NC.  
4.1 Eavesdropping 
An eavesdropper aims to retrieve sensitive information such as native packets, public 
keys, private keys, and passwords of other nodes by wiretapping one or several wired 
links, or overhearing the wireless transmission. In this regard, eavesdroppers neither 
inject packets nor modify them. They only listen to links to get the essential 
information that should be kept secret during the communication. Therefore, 
eavesdropping is known as a passive attack. Eavesdroppers can not only be external 
nodes but also malicious intermediate nodes. If they are able to access an adequate 
number of linearly independent combinations of packets, then they can decode the 
packets and have access to all transmitted information (see Figure 2) [14, 24, 25].  
 
 
Figure 2. Internal and External Eavesdropping attacker 
Eavesdropping attacks are generally classified based on two different views. The first 
view is based on the level that a node has access to the packets crossing the network 
and classifies the eavesdropper nodes into three types: i) nice but curious, ii) 
wiretapping, and iii) worst-case eavesdroppers [25, 26]. Nice but curious nodes are 
also called non-malicious nodes because they are well behaved in the sense of 
communication protocols, but they want to obtain some information from the data 
flows that pass through them. The curious nodes cannot get significant information, 
because in random linear network coding (RLNC), packets are coded and none of 
them has access to sufficient number of coded packets. On the other hand, the 
wiretapping nodes (usually external eavesdroppers) are more capable of accessing the 
secret information due to their access to subset of communication links (i.e., they 
have access to more coded packets). Finally, the eavesdropper nodes of the third type 
are classified as the worst-case node since they have access to all of the transmitted 
packets. Therefore, in this case, ensuring information confidentiality is not only 
harder, but also more critical. 
The second view is based on the type of the NC protocols (i.e., stateless NC proto-
cols or state-aware NC protocols) [24, 25]. In the case of stateless NC protocols, due 
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to the RLNC properties, eavesdropping attack is less crucial. This is because the 
eavesdropper is not able to decode the coded packets and obtain native packets until 
he/she has access to a sufficient number of coded packets. In contrast, in the case of 
state-aware NC protocols, eavesdropping attack is crucial since the coding is local and 
each intermediate node decodes packets before recoding them. Thus, the eavesdrop-
per can access native packets. 
4.2 Traffic Analysis 
Traffic analysis is one of the most common attacks in wireless networks. In traffic 
analysis attack, the attackers monitor the transmissions in the network in order to 
extract information about the source and destination of the packets as well as the net-
work topology. In other words, adversaries threat the confidentially of the networks 
with traffic analysis and monitoring [25, 27]. This threat is crucial in both the state-
aware and stateless network coding protocols [24]. 
4.3 Impersonation 
An impersonation attacker sends queries to the victim nodes by using other legitimate 
node’s identity (e.g., MAC or IP address [28]) in order to gain information. State-
aware network coding protocols can be affected by this type of attacks due to the fact 
that these protocols rely on network nodes [14]. In other words, the goal of imperson-
ation attack is to degrade the authenticity property in NC-enabled networks. This 
attack is a kind of active eavesdropping and sometimes it is the basis for launching 
further more sophisticated attacks [24].  
4.4 Man-in-the-middle 
In the Man-in-the-middle attack, the attacker (i.e., a malicious node) lies on a com-
munication link between the sender and the receiver in order to impersonate other 
nodes and relays received messages by exploiting link spoofing techniques, such as 
advertising fake links and sending routing control packets, including wrong infor-





Figure 3. Man-in-the-middle attack. 
4.5 Byzantine Fabrication 
Byzantine fabrication attack is a severe security threat where an adversary node in-
jects corrupted packets into the network to corrupt other packets based on the nature 
of packet mixing in network coding schemes [25]. Additionally, this attack can dis-
rupt the routing operation of network in different ways such as forwarding data pack-
ets through non-optimal or even invalid routes and generating routing loops (see Fig-
ure 4) [14, 24]. This attack is a threat to both stateless and state-aware network coding 
protocols. In state-aware network coding protocols, packet headers normally include 
topology states and routing information, and thus the attackers can send wrong infor-
mation to nodes about the state and neighbors’ information. Besides, in stateless net-
work coding protocols, headers normally include needed decoding vectors that attack-
ers can change [25].  
 
Figure 4. Byzantine Fabrication attack. 
4.6 Byzantine Modification (Pollution) 
In a byzantine modification attack, adversary aims to make some changes (i.e., invalid 
coding operations) to data in transit and threat the integrity of the packets in the net-
works [29]. They inject corrupted packets or modify them. There are a lot of attacks 
which use this technique to threat the networks, such as wormhole, black hole, selec-
tive forwarding and dropping attack, man-in-the-middle, link spoofing, routing at-
tacks and repudiation [24]. These attacks can be considered as special types of Byzan-
tine modification attacks. In stateless network coding, the adversary injects or modi-
fies packets in transit, whereas in state-aware network coding the adversary injects or 
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modifies not only packets in transit but also state information such as topology infor-
mation and buffer state [14, 26]. 
4.7 Byzantine Replay 
In Byzantine replay attack the malicious nodes or SN can reuse coded packets with 
the same logical identifier that were authenticated previously (e.g., old coded packets 
that were previously stored on compromised nodes and had successfully passed the 
integrity verification. Due to sending these old messages, the network resources are 
wasted and eventually throughput rate is degraded [31, 32]. If a malicious or com-
promise node is able to find and reuse old coded packets, the data decoding condition 
could be broken, because they are linearly dependent with other coded blocks that are 
currently stored (see Figure 5). Replay attack can reduce network coding throughput, 
wasting resources and processing time in both stateless and state-aware network cod-
ing protocols by injection packets which are repeated into the information flow [14]. 
 
Figure 5. Byzantine Reply attack. 
4.8 Wormhole 
In this attack two or more malicious nodes collaborate and create a tunnel between 
two nodes (see Figure 6). Then, they persuade the neighbor nodes that two side of 
tunnel are in the same range. Afterwards, these wormhole attackers can record pack-
ets and retransmit them through the tunnel. Wormhole attack can have more severe 
impact on state-aware NC protocols (e.g., disruption of the route discovery process) 
compared to its impact on stateless protocols [14, 33]. 
 
Figure 6. Wormhole attack. 
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4.9 Black hole 
The attacker exploits routing protocols to advertise itself as a valid and the shortest 
path to a destination. In this regard, the nodes are convinced to use this path to send 
data packets towards that destination. Hence, data packets can be intercept-
ed/eavesdropped or the routing operations simply can be denied (i.e., black-hole at-
tack) that decrease the network performance. This attack can reduce performance of 
the network in both state-aware and stateless protocols [24, 34]. 
4.10 Entropy Attack 
In entropy attacks, the attacker creates packets containing information already known 
by the systems (i.e., non-innovative packets). In particular, the adversary node creates 
a non-innovative coded packet that is a non-random linear combination of coded 
packets so that the coded packet is linearly dependent with the coded packets stored at 
downstream node. The valid but linearly dependent coded packet wastes resources as 
it does not provide any useful information to the receivers so that they can decode the 
original packets [31]. Furthermore, the authors in [31] have classified the entropy 
attacks into two main categories which require deferent capabilities from an attacker: 
a) Local entropy attack: the attacker generates non-innovative coded packets to the 
local neighboring nodes; b) Global entropy attack: the attacker generates coded pack-
ets that are seemingly innovative to local neighboring nodes but are non-innovative to 
at least one distant downstream node. 
4.11 Denial of Service (DOS): 
In Denial of Service (DoS) attack, the attacker attempts to make the resources of a  
system unavailable to the legitimate users, Actually, the attacker targets the availabil-
ity of the system [14]. For example, in a network coding-enabled network, the adver-
sary can send a lot of requests, such as packet processing and forwarding, to the vic-
tim in order to deplete its resources [24]. Moreover, it is worthwhile to mention that 
there are different types of DoS attacks at different layers that affect differently the 
network. Thus, DoS attacks include the following main types of attacks: jamming and 
tempering at the physical layer, collision and exhaustion at the link layer, black holes 
and routing table overflow at the network layer, SYN flooding and de-
synchronization at the transport layer, and finally failure in the web services at the 
application layer [34]. Finally, in NC state-aware schemes, a malicious node can easi-
ly perform a DoS attack by flooding its neighbours with a high volume of corrupted 
packets or even legitimate packets but old and repetitive packets [14].   
5 Conclusion 
In this paper, we provided a categorization of potential security attacks in network 
coding-enabled mobile small cells due to the inherent vulnerabilities of NC. More 
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precisely, we focused on the identification and categorization of the main potential 
security attacks on a scenario architecture of the EU funded H2020-MSCA project 
“SECRET” which is based on secure network coding-enabled mobile small cells. 
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